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Abstract 
The  theme  of  the  relationship  between  inequality  and  economic  growth  has  gained  considerable 
attention  among  economists  over  the  last  two  decades.  In  this  paper,  we  analyse  the  effect  of 
inequality on growth, whose related literature has been producing inconclusive results. 
After an exhaustive study of the major empirical works in this specific research area, we are able not 
only to advance with some potential explanations for the apparent lack of consensus on the empirical 
assessment of the inequality-growth relationship, but also to achieve a better understanding of the 
nature of this relationship and the forces underlying it.  
We conclude that the disparities found in the results of the estimation of the reduced-form relationship 
are most likely due to three dimensions: differences in the estimation techniques, the countries and the 
periods included in the sample, and the variable used to measure inequality. The last two aspects have 
particularly  important  implications.  First,  country/region  specificities  play  a  crucial  role  in  the 
relationship between inequality and growth, so more emphasis should be put on the estimation of such 
a relationship on a national/regional basis, rather than trying to establish universal patterns. Second, 
the time horizon of the analysis should be carefully chosen, as different transmission channels from 
inequality to growth tend to operate differently in the short and in the long-run. Third, the fact that 
inequality in wealth distribution has a stronger negative effect on growth than inequality in income 
distribution may indicate that the channels through which inequality affects growth are not the same in 
both distributions. Therefore, we argue that in order to produce an accurate assessment of both the 
reduced-form  relationship  and  the  underlying  transmission  channels  these  aspects  should  be 
accordingly considered, which has not been the case in most of the empirical literature.  
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1.  Introduction 
The  theme  of  the  relationship  between  inequality  and  economic  growth  has  gained 
considerable attention among economists over the last two decades. Since the late 1980s, 
hundreds of theoretical and empirical papers have been produced.
3 On the one hand, there is a 
significant strand of the literature addressing the causation from growth to inequality, which 
has very much focused on the assessment of the well-known inverted-U Kuznets hypothesis 
(Kuznets,  1955).  On  the  other  hand,  another  research  line  has  focused  on  the  reverse 
causation, i.e., on the effect of inequality on growth. In this paper we concentrate on this 
second causality type, whose related literature has led to inconclusive results. 
Regarding  the  theoretical  literature,  several  mechanisms  through  which  inequality  affects 
growth  have  been  presented,  the  most  important  being  the  credit  market  imperfections 
channel,  the  fiscal  policy  channel,  the  socio-political  instability  channel,  and  the  savings 
channel. Most of the theoretical models produced within these approaches predict a negative 
effect  of  inequality  on  growth  (e.g.,  Galor  and  Zeira  1993,  Banerjee  and  Newman  1993, 
Alesina and Rodrik 1994, Persson and Tabellini 1994, Alesina and Perotti 1996).  
As for the empirical literature, a considerable number of works have been produced in an 
attempt to test both the reduced-form relationship between inequality  and growth and the 
underlying mechanisms. They present, however, very different results regarding the signal of 
the relationship (some studies conclude that inequality is harmful for growth; other studies 
conclude that it is beneficial; some others find a non-significant relationship) and the validity 
of each mechanism. Besides, the empirical studies significantly differ according to several 
methodological issues, such as the way of measuring inequality, the sample, the functional 
form of the regression, the estimation techniques, and the source, quality and structure of 
income  distribution  data.  Thus,  it  is  important  to  examine  how  these  methodological 
differences influence the final results. This is the first objective of this paper. To do so, we 
first present a systematization of the key results of major empirical works, as well as of the 
way they address the abovementioned methodological issues, and then try to derive some 
                                                           
3 Based on the Econlit, an electronic bibliographic database maintained by The American Economic Association, 
we  have  implemented  a  procedure  using  in  simultaneous  two  terms  as  search  keywords:  ‘inequality’  and 
‘economic growth’. The search procedure is encompassing since it covers the keywords in several dimensions: 
the title, the abstract and the main text of the articles. Despite the limitations associated with the choice of search 
keywords, we consider that the selected keyword combination - ‘inequality’ and ‘economic growth’- captures the 
core  contributions  in  the  area  under  analysis.  This  small  bibliometric  exercise  allows  us  to  confirm  with 
quantitative evidence the boom registered by this line of research since 1990. Since 1969, more than 90% of total 
records appear from 1990 onwards. 3 
 
conclusions through a heuristic approach. The second goal of the paper is to investigate some 
possible causes and implications of these conclusions. By doing so, we will be able not only 
to  advance  with  some  potential  explanations  for  the  apparent  lack  of  consensus  on  the 
empirical  assessment  of  the  inequality-growth  relationship,  but  also  to  have  a  better 
understanding of the nature of this relationship and the forces underlying it.  
The paper is structured as follows. After the Introduction, Section 2 presents a brief survey of 
the main theoretical approaches on the effects of inequality on growth. Section 3 uncovers the 
main  empirical  works,  testing  both  the  reduced-form  relationship  and  the  transmission 
channels from inequality to growth. An emphasis is put on the systematization of the key 
results  of  the  selected  studies,  as  well  as  of  the  ways  they  approach  some  of  the 
methodological issues mentioned above. In Section 4 a critical discussion of these results and 
methodological  issues  is  produced,  with  a  focus  on  the  ideas  mentioned  in  the  previous 
paragraph. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.  Inequality  and  Economic  Growth:  a  Brief  Survey  of  the  Main  Theoretical 
Approaches 
The  theoretical  literature  on  the  effects  of  inequality  on  economic  growth  has  grown 
enormously over the last two decades. Particularly since the early 1990s, many theories have 
been  constructed  to  examine  the  channels  through  which  inequality  influences  economic 
growth. As a consequence, there is by now a rich literature on the subject which has been 
thoroughly surveyed by Perotti (1996), Aghion et al. (1999), Barro (2000), among others. The 
main purpose of this section is to briefly review this literature in order to better accomplish our 
research goal. 
In  general,  we  can  identify  four  main  approaches,  each  corresponding  to  a  specific 
transmission channel: the credit market imperfections channel, the fiscal policy channel, the 
sociopolitical instability channel and the saving channel. The first three approaches predict a 
negative impact of inequality on growth, whereas the last one predicts a positive impact. 
2.1  The credit market imperfections channel 
The credit market imperfections channel explores the implications of inequality on investment 
in human and physical capital in the presence of borrowing constraints. The key idea of this 
approach is that when there are major restrictions on borrowing, and investment in physical 4 
 
and human capital is associated with significant fixed costs, inequality is harmful for growth, 
as it prevents the poor from carrying out these investments.  
The origin of this approach can be traced to Galor and Zeira (1993). In this seminal paper, 
they analyze the theoretical link between income distribution and economic growth through 
investment in education in an overlapping generations’ framework, with individuals living for 
two periods and with intergenerational altruism. In each period, there is a single good that can 
be produced with two technologies: one using skilled labor and capital, and the other using 
unskilled labor only. Individuals live for two periods: in the first period, they may either 
invest in human capital or work as unskilled; in the second period, they work as skilled or 
unskilled (according to their education level), consume, and leave bequests. Individuals are 
assumed  to  be  born  with  the  same  potential  abilities  and  preferences;  they  differ  only 
according to their inherited wealth. Capital market imperfections assume the form of a higher 
interest  rate  for  borrowers  than  for  lenders,  which  makes  borrowing  costly  and  difficult. 
Therefore, those who have a poor initial wealth are not willing to invest in education, since 
they would have to borrow a significant amount. Education is then limited to individuals with 
sufficiently high initial wealth. Hence, the inheritance of each individual fully determines 
his/her decisions to invest in education, so initial wealth distribution determines the aggregate 
level of investment, output, and skilled and unskilled labor in the short-term.  
However, wealth distribution also has an effect on these variables in the long-run, as the 
amount of investment in human capital in a certain time period determines the distribution of 
inheritances in the following period, which gradually changes the distribution of wealth over 
time.  By  analysing  the  dynamics  of  the  economy,  Galor  and  Zeira  (1993)  show  that  the 
economy converges to a long-run equilibrium with two groups of agents: the rich dynasties, in 
which all generations invest in human capital, work as skilled and leave a large bequest, and 
the poor ones, where people inherit less, work as unskilled and leave less to their children. 
The relative size of these two groups depends on the initial distribution of wealth, as the more 
individuals with low initial wealth, the more unskilled workers in the  long-run. Thus,  an 
economy which is initially poor ends up poor in the long run; an economy which is initially 
rich and whose wealth is distributed among many, ends up rich; but an economy with a large 
initial amount of wealth, which is held by a few, ends up poor. Thus, there is path dependency, 
as economies may converge to different steady-states, depending on their initial conditions. 
This is possible only if another crucial assumption is added to the model, namely indivisibility 
in investment in human capital (that is, non-convexity of the production technology). 5 
 
The subsequent studies that have emerged within this approach maintain the key features of the 
Galor and Zeira’s (1993) model, namely: the assumptions of credit market imperfections and 
fixed costs associated with investment, the framework based on a model of economic growth 
with overlapping generations, and the fundamental result that inequality harms growth.  
Banerjee and Newman (1993) examine the effect of inequality on a different type of choice, 
the choice between becoming an entrepreneur or a worker (rather than the choice between 
becoming a skilled or an unskilled worker). The key idea is that, if lenders refuse to make 
loans available to those with a low wealth, poor people will not have the necessary amount to 
invest in an entrepreneurship activity, thereby opting to work. Thus, in a certain period, the 
institutional structure of the economy, represented by the pattern of occupations, depends on 
wealth distribution. This pattern, in turn, determines both the wage equilibrium and the saving 
rate in the following period, thereby generating a new distribution of wealth and a new pattern 
of occupational choice. We will have then a dynamical system, in which the evolution of 
wages,  savings,  income  distribution,  occupational  patterns  and  output  are  endogenously 
determined. The authors show that a highly unequal initial distribution of wealth may result in 
an under-investment in the entrepreneurial activity and may therefore be harmful for growth. 
Aghion and Bolton (1997) and Piketty (1997) introduce a new element in the analysis, as they 
endogeneize the interest rate. By explicitly modeling the supply side of the credit market, they 
explore the interplay between the capital market equilibrium (and the interest rate equilibrium) 
and  the  distribution  of  wealth.  Whereas  Aghion  and  Bolton  (1997)  focus  on  finding 
conditions under which there is a non-monotonic evolution of income inequality towards a 
unique-steady state, Piketty (1997) shows that economies may converge to different steady-
states, depending on their initial conditions. In particular, he shows that the higher the initial 
inequality in wealth distribution, the higher the demand for credit and therefore the higher the 
interest rate in the future. Higher interest rates, in turn, prevent the poor from accumulating 
and investing in physical capital (credit rationing increases), thereby harming growth.    
Owen and Weil (1998), and Maoz and Moav (1999), in turn, focus on the effect of inequality 
on the degree of intergenerational mobility and on the efficiency in the allocation of talents 
across  occupations.  Contrarily  to  the  previous  studies,  they  consider  that  the  decision  of 
investing in education is positively influenced not only by individuals’ inheritance but also by 
their differentiate ability. Due to the complementarity between educated and non-educated 
workers, a developed economy with high levels of human capital will have higher relative 
wages for uneducated workers, making it more likely that the children of such workers will be 6 
 
able to afford an education and the children of educated workers will have fewer incentives to 
become educated. Thus, richer economies tend to experience a high degree of upward and 
downward mobility, as well as low levels of wage gaps and inequality. A high degree of 
mobility, in turn, has a positive impact on long-term growth, as it leads to a high correlation 
between ability and human capital, thereby improving the efficiency in which education is 
provided.  Therefore,  as  they  prevent  high-ability  poor  people  from  getting  an  education, 
credit constraints hinder wage inequality reduction and harm human capital accumulation, 
upward mobility, education efficiency and long-term growth.  
2.2  The fiscal policy channel   
The fiscal policy approach further advanced the idea that inequality has a negative impact on 
economic growth. According to this approach, whose major proponents are Bertola (1993) 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994), and Persson  and Tabellini (1994), income  distribution affects 
growth via its effects on government expenditure and taxation. 
The theoretical models presented by the three abovementioned studies combine elements of 
two important strands in the economics literature – the endogenous growth theory and the 
political economy approach. Typically, output depends on capital, labor and on a public good, 
the latter being financed by a proportional tax on capital (capital is meant to capture all-
growth  producing  assets,  including  physical  capital,  human  capital,  and  proprietary 
technology,  so  the  tax  on  capital  must  be  interpreted  as  a  metaphor  for  any  kind  of 
redistributive  policy  that  transfers  income  to  unskilled  labor  and  reduces  incentive  to 
accumulate). Since tax revenues are redistributed lump-sum to all individuals and they differ 
in their endowment of capital and labor, each one will have a different view on what the 
common tax rate should be. In particular, those with a low share of capital income will prefer 
a higher tax rate.  
Since fiscal policy is decided by majority voting, one can use the median voter theorem to 
investigate the relationship between inequality and growth: the more equitable the distribution 
in the economy, the better endowed the median voter with capital, and consequently, the 
lower  the  equilibrium  level  of  taxation.  Thus,  taxation  and  redistributive  government 
expenditure increase as inequality increases. This mechanism, which Perotti (1996) calls a 
“political  mechanism”,  constitutes  the  first  link  of  this  approach.  The  second  link  –  the 
“economic mechanism” – is based on the idea that taxation and redistribution, in turn, are 7 
 
harmful  for  growth  because  of  their  distortionary  effects  on  savings  and  investment. 
Combining these two links, we should expect a negative effect of inequality on growth.  
2.3  The sociopolitical instability channel  
Inequality  and  its  association  with  sociopolitical  instability  have  been  identified  as  an 
additional barrier to economic growth. Alesina and Perotti (1996), Gupta (1990) and others 
argue that a highly unequal distribution of resources increases sociopolitical instability, as it 
makes  individuals  more  prone  to  engage  in  rent-seeking  activities,  as  well  as  in  violent 
protests, revolutions, and coups. Socio-political instability, in turn, has a negative impact on 
investment, because it increases uncertainty and causes disruptions of productive activities, 
and therefore a fall in the productivity of labor and capital. Thus, as in the case of the fiscal 
policy  channel,  this  approach  is  composed  of  two  links  –  inequality  raises  sociopolitical 
instability (first link), and sociopolitical instability harms investment and growth (second link). 
2.4  The saving channel 
Contrarily to the three channels presented above, the saving channel supports the classical 
view that inequality has a positive impact on growth (Kaldor, 1956). The key idea underlying 
this channel is Kaldor’s hypothesis that the marginal propensity to save of the rich is higher 
than  that  of  the  poor.  Consequently,  as  it  channels  resources  towards  individuals  whose 
marginal propensity to save is higher, inequality increases aggregate savings, thereby fostering 
investment  and  growth.  To  our  knowledge,  there  are  no  theoretical  models  addressing 
specifically  this  channel  within  the  theoretical  literature  on  the  effects  of  inequality  on 
growth. However, we mention this channel, since, according to Barro (2000) and Knowles 
(2001),  some  economists  still  believe  that  it  plays  an  important  role  in  the  relationship 
between inequality and growth. 
 
3.  The Empirical Literature  
Following the explosion of the theoretical literature on the inequality-growth relationship in 
the 1990s, a significant branch of empirical work has been developed, in an attempt to test the 
main theoretical predictions. Over the last two decades, hundreds of empirical papers have 
been produced, some of them confirming the results of the main theoretical models, others 
rejecting them. The purpose of this section is to uncover the main works within this empirical 8 
 
literature. We will divide the analysis in two parts: the first part uncovers those studies testing 
the reduced form relationship between inequality and growth, while the second part focuses 
on those studies testing the transmission channels sustained by the theoretical literature.
4 
 
3.1.  Testing the reduced-form relationship 
3.1.1. The early consensus on the negative impact of inequality on growth 
A  first  set  of  studies  –  Alesina  and  Rodrik  (1994),  Persson  and  Tabellini  (1994),  Clarke 
(1995), and Perotti (1996) – aimed at testing the reduced-form relationship between inequality 
and growth. To do so, they all used cross-section data and estimated a linear equation in 
which  the  dependent  variable  –  the  output  growth  rate  –  was  regressed  on  a  measure  of 
inequality and on a set of other variables that were found relevant in the explanation of cross-
country growth performance in the highly influential Barro’s (1991) econometric work. These 
variables include initial output, some measure of human capital, physical capital investment 
ratio,  and  regional  dummies,  among  others.  The  aim  was  to  identify  the  sign  and  to 
investigate the statistic significance of the variable associated with inequality, which, in all 
studies, was measured using data on income distribution. In order to avoid reverse causation 
from growth to the explanatory variables, in particular inequality, the former was measured as 
the average of annual growth rates for a relatively long period (20-30 years), whereas the 
latter were measured in the beginning of the time horizon for growth.  
The  studies  differ  primarily  on  three  aspects:  the  source  of  income  distribution  data,  the 
measure of inequality and the sample. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) use income data from Jain 
(1975) and Fields (1989); Persson and Tabellini (1994) from Paukert (1973); Perotti (1996) 
from Jain (1975) and Lecaillon (1975); and Clarke (1975) from the United Nations Social 
Indicators. Regarding the measurement of inequality, 5 different measures are used: the Gini 
coefficient (by Alesina and Rodrik, 1994, and Clarke, 1995); the share of the fourth quintile 
(by Persson and Tabellini, 1994, and Clarke, 1995), the share of the third and fourth quintiles 
(by Perotti, 1996, and Clarke); the coefficient of variation (by Clarke, 1995); and the Theil’s 
index (by Clarke, 1995). As for the samples, with the exception of Clarke (1995), all the 
studies use average annual growth on the period 1960-1985 period, and a sample of several 
countries (whose dimension ranges from 40 to 80), selected on the basis of data availability. 
                                                           
4 In both parts, we consider only those works that were produced from the early 1990s onwards, as this was the 
period in which the empirical literature on the effect of inequality on growth exploded. However, there were 
studies produced before 1990, some of them examined in Benabou (1996). 9 
 
Despite  these  differences,  the  estimation  of  the  regressions  using  Ordinary  Least  Squares 
(OLS) shows in all studies that inequality has a negative, significant impact on subsequent 
growth, thereby confirming the predictions of most of the theoretical approaches mentioned in 
the previous section. With the exception of Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Perotti (1996) – 
in which the inclusion of regional dummies as explanatory variables weakens considerably 
the effect of inequality on growth – this result is robust to different sensitivity analyses, such 
as different inequality measures, samples, time periods, explanatory variables, and estimation 
techniques, measurement errors, reverse causation, and heteroskedasticity. Most studies tested 
the  inequality-growth  relationship  splitting  their  samples  in  sub-samples  according  to  the 
countries’ political regime (democracy or non-democracy) or to the development level (poor 
or rich countries). While Persson and Tabellini (1994) found a significant difference between 
democracies  and  non-democracies  –  the  relationship  is  statistically  significant  only  in 
democracies  –  the  other  authors  did  not.  Perotti  (1996),  in  turn,  found  that  the  negative 
inequality-growth correlation is statistically significant only in rich countries.  
3.1.2.  Challenging the results and the methodology of the early empirical works 
By the late 1990s, the general consensus on the negative impact of inequality on growth 
began to be challenged. Several papers emerged criticizing the data quality and some of the 
methodological procedures used in the previous empirical studies. In most cases the result 
was an invalidation of the negative relationship between inequality and economic growth. 
From the analysis of this more recent literature, we identify, in general, five major criticisms: 
the  doubtful  quality  of  income  distribution  data;  the  lack  of  comparable  data  on  income 
distribution; the use of income distribution to measure inequality; the use of cross-section 
data; and the estimation of a linear growth regression.  
￿  The doubtful quality of income distribution data 
Deininger and Squire (1996) argue that in order to provide a basis for inferences on issues of 
inequality and growth, data on inequality should: i) be based on household surveys, rather 
than estimates drawn from national accounts statistics; ii) have comprehensive coverage of all 
sources  of  income  or  uses  of  expenditure,  rather  than  covering  only  wages;  iii)  be 
representative of the population at the national level, rather than dealing with, for example, 
only the rural urban population or with taxpayers.  10 
 
Based on these criteria, Deininger and Squire (1996) assembled a high-quality data set which 
was subsequently used by several empirical studies. In one of these studies, Deininger and 
Squire (1998) show that the data used in previous works was of doubtful quality,  as the 
application of these criteria led to a considerable reduction in the size of the sample that was 
used to estimate the inequality-growth relationship. Moreover, using a sample composed by 
the  87  countries  whose  data  satisfy  their  criteria,  Deininger  and  Squire  (1998)  test  the 
reduced-form relationship and find that the effect of income inequality on subsequent growth 
is not very robust, as the coefficient of inequality is not statistically different from zero once 
regional  dummy  variables  are  introduced  in  the  Barro-type  regression.  This  suggests  that 
region-specific characteristics which may include income inequality could be at the root of the 
relationship observed in the previous empirical literature.  
￿  Stressing the role of land and human capital inequality 
Deininger  and  Squire  (1998)  also  criticize  the  previous  works  in  the  way  inequality  was 
measured. They argue that inequality should be measured using land distribution (as a proxy 
of wealth distribution) instead of income distribution, since: i) it is associated with far less 
measurement errors; ii) its coverage is more equal both geographically and over time; iii) the 
relevant distribution in explaining the relationship between inequality and growth in many 
theoretical analyses is that of wealth, not of income.  
Using initial distribution of land as a measure of inequality, Deininger and Squire (1998) find 
a negative, significant effect of inequality on growth, even when regional dummy variables 
are  included,  which  indicates  that  the  initial  distribution  of  assets  may  capture  economic 
characteristics that are only imperfectly reflected in standard measures of income inequality. 
However, when the sample is split according to the countries’ development level or political 
regime, the data shows that the significant, negative effect exists only in non-democracies and 
primarily in poor countries. 
Using panel data instead of cross-section data, Deininger and Olinto (2000) also find that 
initial land distribution, but not initial income distribution, has a significant growth-reducing 
impact. When including both variables simultaneously, the former maintains its negative sign, 
but the latter does not, which suggests that both types of distributions affect growth through 
different channels. A similar result is found by Alesina and Rodrik (1994). 11 
 
Castelló and Domenech (2002) test the impact of inequality on growth using human capital 
instead of income or land inequality. They argue that income and land inequality may be 
insufficient measures of wealth inequality, since other variables such as human capital are 
also  important  determinants  of  wealth.  Besides,  in  some  theoretical  models  analyzing  the 
relationship between inequality and growth, the role played by human capital endowment is 
very important if not crucial, as it shapes the distribution of income and wealth. The results 
found by Castelló and Domenech are basically the same as those obtained by the authors that 
use land inequality: i) income distribution is not statistically significant to explain growth, 
once regional variables are added; ii) human capital distribution has a strong, negative effect 
on subsequent growth; iii) when both variables are included simultaneously, the coefficient 
associated  with  human  capital  inequality  remains  negative,  but  that  of  income  inequality 
becomes positive. 
￿  The lack of comparable data on income distribution 
Knowles (2001) produced a very accurate and comprehensive analysis of the way income 
inequality data had been used in previous works. His main point is that nearly all of them use 
inequality  data  that  was  not  consistently  measured,  that  is,  data  in  which  distribution  is 
measured  using  different  criteria  across  countries.  In  particular,  some  countries  typically 
collect information on gross income, whereas other countries more often collect information 
on expenditures. This creates a problem because, as expenditures tend to be more equally 
distributed than income, the mixing of both indicators introduces a bias in the results. 
The author shows that it does make a difference how income distribution is measured. Using a 
sample of 84 countries, where expenditure and income inequality are both used, Knowles 
obtains, consistently with the earlier works, a negative and significant relationship between 
inequality and growth. However, when the sample is reduced to those countries for which 
gross  income  data  is  used  (primarily  developed  countries),  such  a  relationship  becomes 
insignificant. Thus, the first major conclusion of Knowles’ study is that the previous empirical 
works should be interpreted with some caution, as they measure inequality inconsistently and 
this may make a difference in the final results. 
Yet, Knowles argues that it is not appropriate to use gross income data, since most of the 
channels presented in the literature relate to distribution of income after redistribution, which 
can be measured by expenditure. Therefore, he estimates another equation with those countries 
for which expenditure data is available (mainly developed countries) and finds that inequality 12 
 
has a significant, negative effect on growth. Thus, the second conclusion of this study is that 
there is a negative correlation between inequality and growth, but only when the focus is on 
inequality after redistribution. 
￿  The use of panel data instead of cross-section data 
Following the release of the Deininger and Squire inequality dataset that assembled more 
reliable  data  with  time  series  information  for  a  larger  group  of  countries,  several  studies 
estimated  the  inequality-growth  relationship  using  panel  data  techniques.  These  studies 
include  Forbes  (2000),  Barro  (2000),  Deininger  and  Olinto  (2000),  Banerjee  and  Duflo 
(2003), and others.  
According to Forbes (2000), the use of panel data is desirable for two reasons. First, it allows 
controlling  for  differences  in  time-invariant,  unobservable  country  characteristics,  thereby 
removing any bias resulting from the correlation of these characteristics with the explanatory 
variables. On the other hand, cross-country data do not directly address the important policy 
question of how a change in a country’s level of inequality will affect growth within that 
country; panel techniques can specifically estimate such an impact. 
The panel data evidence on the correlation between income inequality and growth is quite 
diverse. Forbes (2000) finds a positive relationship for high and mid-income countries that 
persists across different samples, variable definitions and model specifications, but not through 
all the time period under consideration. Barro (2000) obtains a negative relationship for poor 
countries,  a  positive  relationship  for  developed  countries,  and  an  insignificant  one  when 
considering both groups of countries. Banerjje and Duflo (2003) find that it is a change in the 
direction, not the initial level of inequality, that leads to slower future growth. Deininger and 
Olinto (2000), in turn, find a negative correlation between land inequality and growth.  
With the exception of Barro (2000), that considers 10-year growth episodes, these studies 
assess the impact of inequality on growth over 5-year periods, all taking the Gini coefficient 
as the reference inequality measure and estimating the relationship using different panel data 
techniques  (fixed  effects,  random  effects,  General  Method  of  Moments  (GMM),  Kernel 
regression, series estimator). All of them also include some form of sensitivity analysis, such 
as the consideration of different inequality measures, control variables, samples of countries, 
and estimation techniques. 
￿  Questioning the linear regression structure  13 
 
As  we  have  seen,  the  vast  majority  of  the  empirical  literature  has  examined  the  growth-
inequality relationship by estimating a growth Barro-type linear equation with inequality as an 
additional  explanatory  variable.  Banerjee  and  Duflo  (2003)  question  this  econometric 
methodology. First, using non-parametric methods, they show that there are strong a priori 
reasons  to  believe  that  the  linear  regression  structure  imposed  in  the  previous  studies  is 
inconsistent with the predictions of the theoretic models. In particular, taking into account the 
characteristics of some of these models, it is demonstrated that the growth rate is expected to 
be an inverted U-shaped function of inequality, that is, changes in inequality in any direction 
are associated with reduced growth in the next period. Second, the authors test this hypothesis 
using a panel of 70 countries. The data show that the hypothesis is confirmed: there is strong 
evidence that the inequality-growth relationship is best described by an inverted U-shaped 
function, rather than by a linear one. This result is robust to changes in control variables and 
estimation techniques. According to the authors, this non-linearity is sufficient to explain why 
previous estimates of the growth-inequality relationship have led to so different conclusions.  
In Table 1 we present a systematization of the main features of the studies analyzed in this 
subsection, focusing on the results they obtain and on the abovementioned methodological 
issues. 
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3.2 Testing the Transmission Channels 
Alongside the examination of the reduced-form relationship between inequality and growth, a 
number of empirical studies have tried to estimate the importance of the channels through 
which such a relationship operates (Persson and Tabellini (1994), Alesina and Perotti (1996), 
Perotti (1996), Deininger and Squire (1998), Deininger and Olinto (2000), Sylwester (2000)). 
In this subsection we analyze the contribution of the main empirical studies for the assessment 
of each of the four channels identified in section 2: the sociopolitical instability channel, the 
fiscal policy channel, the credit market imperfections channel, and the saving channel.  
 
3.2.1 The sociopolitical instability channel  
This channel was explicitly addressed by two empirical studies: Alesina and Perotti (1996) 
and Perotti (1996). In both studies, two equations are estimated using cross-section data from 
developed and developing countries: one to test the hypothesis that income inequality increases 15 
 
sociopolitical instability, and the other to test the hypothesis that sociopolitical instability in 
turn reduces investment and growth. In the first equation, an index of socio political instability 
(which  aggregates  four  proxies  of  social  unrest:  political  assassinations,  violent  deaths, 
successful coups, and unsuccessful coups) is regressed as a function of income distribution 
and other variables, whereas in the second equation the average GDP growth rate in the period 
1960-1985 is regressed as a function of the initial levels of the sociopolitical instability index, 
as well as other variables. In both papers, the two hypotheses are confirmed at a 5% level, 
these results being robust to an extensive battery of sensitivity tests, which confirms that the 
sociopolitical instability channel is strongly supported by the empirical evidence.  
3.2.2 The fiscal policy channel 
As he did in the case of the sociopolitical instability channel, Perotti (1996) tests the fiscal 
policy channel by running two regressions, one for each of its underlying mechanisms. The 
political mechanism is tested by regressing the fiscal policy variable (the average marginal tax 
rate  between  1970  and  1985)  on  income  distribution  and  other  variables;  the  economic 
mechanism, in turn, is tested by regressing the growth rate on the fiscal policy variable and 
other regressors. Perotti (1996) does not find support for the fiscal policy channel, as the 
economic mechanism is rejected by the data. Although in the first equation income inequality 
has a strong and positive effect on the average marginal tax rate in democracies (thereby 
lending support to the political mechanism), in the second equation taxation has a positive 
(rather negative, as predicted by the economic mechanism) impact on growth. These results 
remain when other fiscal policy variables are used.  
A similar result is obtained by Persson and Tabellini (1994). Using cross-section data for 43 
countries, they test, first, the effect of income inequality on investment, second, the effect of 
inequality on redistribution (measured by transfers as a fraction of GDP), and third, the effect 
of redistribution on growth. They find that, in accordance with the theory, the first effect is 
negative, statistically significant and is present only in democracies, but the second and third 
effects, despite having expected coefficient signs, are not statistically significant. 
Sylwester (2000), in turn, analyses the fiscal channel in a sample of developed and developing 
countries between 1970 and 1985, concentrating on the influence of public expenditures on 
education. He finds that income inequality has a significant positive impact on expenditures 
for public education (the reason being that highly unequal societies are likely to develop a 
dual system of schools, which increases the fixed costs of rising and supporting the public 
system  of  schools),  and  these  expenditures  in  turn  influence  growth  in  two  opposite 16 
 
directions. On one hand, they have a negative effect on short-term growth (because of the 
distortionary  taxation  effect);  on  the  other  hand,  they  contribute  positively  to  long-term 
growth (because they increase the stock of human capital in the future). Thus, this paper 
confirms the conclusion of Perotti (1996) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) that there is no 
empirical support for the fiscal policy channel in the long-run. However, it introduces the idea 
that such a support may exist in the short-run. 
It should be noted that some of the studies examining the reduced-form relationship between 
inequality  and  growth  test  whether  this  relationship  is  different  in  democratic  and  non-
democratic countries. The aim of this procedure is to check whether inequality influences 
growth through a political mechanism, as, according to the fiscal policy approach, one would 
expect  such  an  influence  to  be  higher  in  democracies.  The  results  are  quite  diverse:  a 
significant negative impact of inequality on growth is found only in democracies by Persson 
and Tabellini (1994), only in non-democracies by Deininger and Squire (1998), and in both 
regimes by Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Clarke (1995), and Perotti (1996). 
Thus, in conclusion, there is no strong empirical support for the fiscal policy channel. 
3.2.3 The credit market imperfections channel 
Besides testing the socio-political instability and the fiscal policy channels, Perotti (1996) also 
tests the validity of the credit market imperfections channel. This mechanism was investigated 
considering  only  its  action  through  investment  in  education  and  associated  endogenous 
fertility decisions. Using data on female and male secondary school and fertility rates, Perotti 
concludes that inequality influences human capital investment negatively and fertility rates 
positively and, these, in turn, have a negative impact on growth. However, more accurate tests 
of this approach using measures of the degree of credit market imperfections (the loan-to-
value  ratio  and  the  ratio  of  the  domestic  credit  to  GDP)  interacted  with  the  income 
distribution  variable  in  the  equation  where  education  is  the  dependent  variable  lead  to 
inconclusive results. 
Deininger and Squire (1998), on the other hand, test the impact of credit market imperfections 
that lead to borrowing constraints impending over physical and human capital investment. 
They advance with the conjecture that lenders are generally more willing to accept physical 
capital as collateral for a loan than to lend against a future stream of earnings associated with 
the acquisition of human capital. Therefore, effects of initial inequality that are transmitted 17 
 
through credit markets are expected to have a more important effect on the stock of human 
capital than on the stock of physical capital. By regressing the proxies of human and physical 
capital  on  inequality  the  authors  confirm  this  hypothesis:  inequality  strongly  harms 
investment in human capital, but it has an insignificant impact on investment in physical 
capital. Hence, the main channel through which it appears to affect growth is schooling. 
Deininger and Olinto (2000) reach a different conclusion. Using panel data for 60 countries, 
they  show  that  land  inequality  has  a  significant  impact  on  growth  but,  once  a  proxy  for 
investment in physical capital is included as explanatory variable, this impact becomes less 
strong. On the other hand, such an investment is significantly correlated to land inequality. 
Therefore, the conclusion is that land inequality influences growth not only directly, but also 
indirectly, via its impact on investment. The credit market imperfections channel, considering 
its action through investment in physical capital, is thus supported by the results of this study. 
3.2.4  The saving channel 
Very little attention has been paid to test the saving channel, perhaps because over the past 
decades there has been limited interest in exploring this link in the theoretical literature. Still, 
Barro  (2000)  slightly  addresses  this  channel  by  checking  how  highly  correlated  income 
inequality is with investment ratios. Using panel data for several countries he shows that such 
a  correlation  is  not  statistically  significant,  both  for  developed  and  for  underdeveloped 
countries. Thus, there is no evidence that the aggregate saving rate, which tends to influence 
the investment ratio, depends on the degree of income inequality.  
The table below summarizes the main conclusions and features of the studies mentioned in 
this subsection for each transmission channel. 
 
Table 2: The empirical literature on the transmission channels 
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4.  The Empirical Literature: a Critical Discussion of the Main Methodological Issues 
and Results  
The previous section provided a review of the main empirical works testing the effect of 
inequality on growth. One of its main insights is that the estimation of this effect is subject to 
a number of methodological issues and difficulties. In fact, the studies differ significantly 
according  to  several  aspects,  such  as  the  way  of  measuring  inequality,  the  sample,  the 
functional  form  of  the  regression,  the  estimation  techniques,  and  the  source,  quality  and 
structure of income distribution data. Another important insight is that the results regarding 
the estimation of both the reduced-form relationship and the transmission channels seem to be 
quite  diverse.  Concerning  the  reduced  form  relationship,  whereas  some  studies  predict  a 
negative  impact  of  inequality  on  growth,  others  predict  an  insignificant  or  even  positive 19 
 
impact.  As  for  the  transmission  channels,  the  results  are  far  from  being  consensual  too. 
Hence, there seems to be a lack of consensus regarding the empirical assessment of the links 
between inequality and growth. Since the analyzed studies present significant differences in 
the  way  they  approach  the  methodological  issues  stated  above,  these  differences  must 
contribute significantly to the disparities in the final results.  
One of the fundamental objectives of this section is to investigate how the methodological 
issues influence the final results of this empirical literature. Based on the systematization 
effort  developed  in  Section  3,  we  will  draw  some  conclusions  concerning  the  potential 
relations between some particular treatment given to a certain methodological issue and the 
final results that are obtained. This is a difficult task, as these empirical studies deal with 
different methodological issues in different ways, so it is not easy to test and prove if the 
disparities in the results between two or more papers are the consequence of approaching 
differently methodological issue A, B, or C. However, if a considerable number of papers 
dealing with a certain methodological issue in the same way obtain similar results, then it is 
reasonable to assume that there is a causal relation between these results and the way that 
specific methodological issue is addressed, even if the other methodological issues are treated 
in a distinct way. Faced with the constraints associated with the intrinsic complexity of the 
subject in study, we will follow a heuristic approach throughout this section: any causal link 
between  the  use  of  a  certain  methodological  technique  and  the  estimation  results  will  be 
considered relevant only if it is supported by most of the papers that deal with it.  
The other objective of this section is to discuss the possible causes and implications of these 
relevant  links.  By  doing  so,  we  will  be  able  not  only  to  advance  with  some  potential 
explanations for the apparent lack of consensus on the empirical assessment of the inequality-
growth relationship, but also to have a better understanding of the nature of this relationship 
and the forces underlying it.  
As in the previous section, the reduced-form relationship and the transmission channels will 
be analyzed separately in two different subsections. 
4.1  The empirical literature on the reduced-form relationship 
Taking into account the above considerations and the information provided in Subsection 3.1, 
we can identify four main conclusions: 
i)  the results of cross-section studies are not strongly affected by differences in estimation 
techniques, inequality measures, and explanatory variables included in the regressions; 20 
 
in panel data studies, however, differences in estimation techniques lead to differences 
in the final results.  
ii)  the effect of inequality on growth is considerably weakened when regional dummies are 
introduced in cross-section studies; 
iii)  the results are sensitive to the type of countries included in the sample; 
iv)  the effect of land and human capital inequality on growth is stronger than that of income 
inequality. 
Next we discuss these four conclusions in detail. 
4.1.1 Estimation techniques, inequality measures, and explanatory variables 
As mentioned in 3.1, most empirical studies examining the reduced-form relationship develop 
some type of sensitivity test in order to assess the robustness of the estimation results. One of 
the  most  common  sensitivity  analyses  procedures  consists  of  changing  the  explanatory 
variables included in the growth regression. Different studies estimate the inequality-growth 
impact using different control variables, but almost all of them examine whether changing 
these  variables  affects  significantly  the  final  results.  With  the  exception  of  the  regional 
variables – whose effect will be subsequently analyzed in more detail – almost all studies find 
that the estimation of the coefficient associated with inequality is not strongly affected by 
changes in the control variables.  
Another commonly used sensitivity test consists in changing the estimation technique. As we 
have seen in Subsection 3.1, cross-section studies estimate the reduced-form relationship by 
OLS. In order to avoid reverse causation from growth to inequality, all of them use values for 
the inequality proxies measured in the beginning of the time period for growth. Some studies 
examine whether changing the way of dealing with reverse causation has a significant impact 
in the final results. In particular, they estimate the growth regression using an alternative 
procedure, which consists of running two-stage least squares regressions and instrumenting 
for the inequality measure. All of them come to the conclusion that the main results are the 
same in both procedures.  
As for panel data studies, the situation is slightly different. First, a wider variety of estimators 
is used. Barro (2000) uses a random effects estimator, Banerjee and Duflo (2003) use Kernel 
regressions and series estimators, and Forbes (2000) and Deininger and Olinto (2000) use the 21 
 
Arellano and Bover’s GMM estimator.
5 The sensitivity analysis conducted by some of these 
studies shows that different methods lead to substantial differences in the estimated value of 
the inequality coefficient. Thus, in contrast with cross section studies, in panel data analyses 
the results seem to vary considerably with the estimation techniques. This may provide a first 
explanation for the diversity of results found by this type of studies.  
Finally, the results do not seem to be significantly affected by the measure of inequality that is 
used. Most studies use the Gini coefficient as the indicator of inequality; the exception is 
Persson and Tabellini (1994), which uses the share of the fourth quintile. Alesina and Perotti 
(1996) argue that the choice between these two types of indicator is  not relevant  for the 
estimation of the effect of inequality on growth, as they are highly correlated. On the other 
hand, Clarke (1995) addresses explicitly this issue by estimating four regressions, each using 
a different measure for income distribution – the Gini coefficient, the share of the fourth 
quintile, the coefficient of variation, and the Theil’s index. In the four models, the estimation 
of the inequality coefficient does not change significantly, which strongly reinforces the idea 
that the way of measuring inequality does not affect the final results.  
4.1.2  Introduction of regional dummies in cross-section studies 
A crucial result that can be derived from the analysis of the empirical literature is that the 
inclusion of regional dummies as explanatory variables in a cross-section regression weakens 
the magnitude of the coefficient associated with inequality. This occurs in all the studies in 
which this procedure is implemented. Persson and Tabellini (1994), Perotti (1996), Deininger 
and  Squire  (1998),  and  Castelló  and  Doménech  (2002)  find  that  income  inequality  has  a 
significant, negative impact on growth, but once regional variables are added such an impact 
becomes  insignificant.  On  the  other  hand,  Deininger  and  Squire  (1998)  and  Castelló  and 
Doménech (2002) find that when income inequality is replaced by land or human capital 
inequality,  the  inclusion  of  regional  dummies  also  weakens  the  inequality-growth 
relationship, although it still remains significant. Thus, it is clear that intercontinental variation 
in inequality, particularly in income inequality, accounts for a substantial part of the negative 
impact of inequality on growth that is found in several cross-section studies. This suggests 
that country and region specificities play a crucial role in explaining such an impact. 
                                                           
5 This estimator first-differences each variable so as to eliminate the country-specific effects and then uses all 
possible lagged values of each of the variables as instruments, thereby correcting the problem of simultaneity. 22 
 
It is worth noting that the results obtained by panel data studies corroborate this idea. Panel 
data estimation controls for differences in time-invariant, unobservable country characteristics, 
thereby removing any bias resulting  from the  correlation of these  characteristics with the 
explanatory variables. As a result, it gives a more accurate indication of how a change in a 
country’s level of inequality predicts a change in that country’s growth rate. Thus, the fact that 
panel data studies lead to so diverse results may be the consequence not only of the use of 
different estimation techniques but also of the idea advanced in the previous paragraph, that 
the relationship between income inequality and growth differs across countries.    
4.1.3  Estimation for different groups of countries 
Another important conclusion that can be derived from the empirical studies is that the results 
are quite sensitive to the type of countries included in the sample. As mentioned in Subsection 
3.1, several authors examining the reduced-form relationship split the original sample in sub-
samples according to the countries’ political regime or development level. In some cases, they 
obtain  significant  differences  in  the  results  for  each  sub-sample.  Let’s  consider,  first,  the 
division between democratic and non-democratic countries. While Alesina and Rodrik (1994), 
Clarke (1995), and Perotti (1996) do not find considerable differences between democratic 
and non-democratic countries, Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Deininger and Squire (1998) 
do: the former find a significant negative impact of inequality on growth only in democracies 
and  the  latter  only  in  non-democracies.  Regarding  the  division  between  rich  and  poor 
countries, the results are very diverse too. Deininger and Squire (1998) and Knowles (2001) 
find a negative relationship for poor countries and an insignificant one for high/mid-income 
countries. Barro (2000) also finds a negative relationship for poor countries, but a positive one 
for rich countries. Forbes (2000), in turn, detects a positive effect for both high and mid 
income countries. By contrast, Perotti (1996) finds that inequality has a negative impact on 
growth only in rich countries.  
Hence, we can conclude that the results are sensitive to the type of countries included in the 
sample, since the estimation of the effect of inequality on growth is significantly different for 
the different groups of countries considered in the studies. Technically speaking, there is no 
parameter  stability  when  using  a  sample  composed  by  countries  with  different  political 
regimes and/or different development levels. This confirms the key idea previously advanced 
that the inequality-growth relationship is strongly influenced by the specific characteristics of 23 
 
each country (or group of countries). Therefore, these characteristics should not be ignored in 
the estimation of this relationship. 
We can also conclude that, despite the differences between poor and rich, and democratic and 
non-democratic countries, there is no compelling evidence for the direction of the income 
inequality effect on growth within each group of countries, when income distribution is used 
as  a  proxy  of  inequality.  In  fact,  taking  into  account  the  results  highlighted  above,  it  is 
possible to find, for each of the four groups of countries that were considered, at least one 
study predicting a positive relationship between inequality and growth, and another study 
predicting a negative one. There is, therefore, no consensus about the magnitude and sign of 
this relationship, even within each group of countries, when inequality in income distribution 
is used.  
4.1.4  Land and human capital inequality vs. income inequality 
It has been already mentioned that some authors suggest that inequality should be measured 
using the distribution of land – Deininger and Squire (1998), Deininger and Olinto (2000) – or 
of human capital – Castelló and Domenéch (2002) – instead of income distribution. They 
argue  that  the  relevant  distribution  in  explaining  the  relationship  between  inequality  and 
growth in many theoretical analyses is that of wealth, which is best described by land or 
human capital, rather than by income. 
The results obtained in all these studies show that inequality in land and in human capital 
distribution has a stronger negative effect on growth than inequality in income distribution. 
On the one hand, Deininger and Squire (1998) find that, when land inequality and income 
inequality are included in separate cross-section regressions and these do not include regional 
dummy variables, the coefficients of both variables have negative signs, but that of the former 
has a stronger magnitude than that of the latter. On the other hand, when regional dummies 
are  included  as  explanatory  variables,  only  the  coefficient  of  land  inequality  remains 
significant. Castelló and Domenéch (2002) find exactly the same  results for inequality in 
human  capital  distribution.  Moreover,  Alesina  and  Rodrik  (1994),  Deininger  and  Olinto 
(2000), and Castelló and Domenéch (2002) find that when both proxies of inequality (income 
and land/human capital) are included simultaneously in the same regression, the coefficient 
associated  with  land/human  capital  remains  negative,  but  that  of  income  becomes  either 
positive  or  insignificant.  Thus,  there  is  some  evidence  that  the  negative  effect  of  wealth 
inequality on growth is stronger than that of income inequality.  24 
 
Before advancing with some possible explanations and discussing the implications of this 
phenomenon, we should note that it does not necessarily contradict the previous conclusion 
that the inequality-growth relationship is strongly influenced by the specific characteristics of 
each country. Indeed, the inclusion of regional variables in cross-section regressions weakens 
the impact of inequality on growth, but in the case of land and human capital inequality this 
impact still remains negative and significant. This suggests that both components – the specific 
characteristics  of  each  country  and  the  channels  through  which  land  and  human  capital 
inequality systematically affect growth – play an important role in the explanation of the 
inequality-growth relationship. 
Let’s move now to the discussion of the possible reasons for the fact that land and human 
capital inequality have a stronger impact on growth than income inequality. We focus on two 
lines of arguments: first, the estimation result of the effect of income inequality on growth 
may be influenced by several problems surrounding data on income distribution; second, the 
fact that the impact of land and human capital distribution is stronger than that of income 
distribution may occur simply because, as stated by Deininger and Squire (1998), the relevant 
distribution in explaining the relationship between inequality and growth in many theoretical 
analyses is that of wealth, not of income. 
The first line of arguments is based on the idea that data on income distribution are often 
associated with problems of measurement and comparability across countries. According to 
Deininger and Squire (1996), comparability of the data on income inequality may be hindered 
by several problems, such as differences in construction methods (data is not always based on 
household surveys, as sometimes estimates drawn from national accounts statistics are used), 
income  definitions  (in  several  countries,  nonwage  income  and  income  from  household 
production account for a significant share of the total income and, therefore, they should not 
be ignored), and data coverage (income data may not cover the entire population, but only a 
subset, e.g. urban population). By collecting data primarily from surveys, official statistical 
publications  and  research  papers,  Deininger  and  Squire  (1996)  overcame  some  of  these 
problems for a large  enough  group of countries, constructing  a new available data set of 
higher quality income distribution data, which, as already mentioned in Subsection 3.1, was 
used in most of the subsequent empirical works testing the inequality-growth relationship. 
One way to check if these problems associated with income inequality data do affect the 
estimates of the effect of inequality on growth is to examine if the use of the Deininger and 
Squire data set resulted in significant changes in these estimates. However, this is not an easy 25 
 
task, as some studies that were produced after the publication of the dataset differ from the 
previous studies not only because they use the new dataset, but also because they use panel 
data instead of cross-section data (Deininger and Olinto, 2000; Forbes, 2000; Barro, 2000; 
Banerjee and Duflo, 2003). Therefore, one cannot say that the differences between the results 
of these studies and those of the previous studies are due to the introduction of higher quality 
income data or to the use of a different data structure. Nevertheless, there are two studies – 
Deininger and Squire (1998) and Knowles (2001) – that make use of the high quality data set 
and maintain the cross-section structure of the data. They both estimate a growth Barro-type 
equation with income inequality as an additional explanatory variable and, similarly to the 
earlier studies, obtain a negative, significant coefficient for inequality. This may indicate that 
the estimation of the effect of income inequality on growth is not affected by the use of high 
quality data; put differently, these two studies  suggest that deficiencies related to income 
distribution data, such as construction methods, data coverage, and income definitions, do not 
significantly affect the key estimates, and therefore, do not explain why the effect of income 
distribution on growth is less stronger than that of land or human capital distribution. 
Nevertheless, some authors suggest that major issues concerning data quality and consistency 
remain, even in the Deininger and Squire data set. Perotti (1996) had already noted that when 
income quintile shares and Gini coefficients are typically computed from surveys (which is 
the case in Deininger and Squire data set), two potential problems arise. First, and for obvious 
reasons, in any given survey the raw figures may be subject to very large measurement errors. 
Second, it is still difficult to establish consistent comparisons across countries, as the surveys 
they  are  derived  from  can  vary  remarkably  with  the  definition  of  the  recipient  unit 
(households vs. individuals), and the income concept (gross income vs. expenditures). With 
respect to the recipient unit, Perotti (1996) argues that there are good reasons to believe that 
data organized by individuals understate the income share of the third and fourth quintiles of 
the distribution, relative to data organized by incomes and, therefore, using both in the same 
sample may not be appropriate. As for the income concept, Knowles (2001) and Milanovic 
(2005) also argue that mixing gross income and expenditure data introduces a bias in the 
results because expenditures tend to be more equally distributed than income. Whether or not 
this bias is sufficiently strong to affect the estimate of the impact of inequality on growth is a 
question that should be answered. According to Knowles (2001), it is, since, as we have seen 
in Subsection 3.1, the results that he finds differ when he considers a sample composed only 
by countries that use data on gross income (sample 1) and another sample only with countries 26 
 
that use data on expenditures (sample 2). However, this conclusion should be interpreted very 
cautiously.  Typically,  European  countries,  the  United  States  and  most  of  Latin  America 
collect  household  income  information,  whereas  African  and  Asian  countries  more  often 
collect information on expenditures. This is the reason why Knowles’ sample 1 is mainly 
composed by mid/high-income countries and sample 2 by low-income countries. Therefore, 
the differences obtained between the two estimations may be due to sample selection, rather 
than data comparability issues. Hence, Knowles’ results do not point necessarily to the idea 
that it does make a difference to estimate the inequality-growth relationship using inequality 
based on gross income or expenditures.  
In conclusion, there is no compelling evidence to support the idea that reasons related to 
problems  of  quality  and  comparability  of  income  distribution  data  are  behind  the  weaker 
relationship between income inequality and growth. On the one hand, the use of Deininger 
and Squire high quality data set does not seem to induce a significant change in the results; on 
the other hand, there are reasons to doubt that the divergences found by Knowles (2001) are 
due to inconsistencies in income measurement. 
We now move our attention to the second possible reason sustaining the fact that land and 
human capital inequality have a stronger effect on growth than income inequality. This reason 
has to do with the nature of the forces underlying the inequality-growth relationship, rather 
than with methodological issues. It is related with the idea advanced by Deininger and Squire 
(1998), Deininger and Olinto (2000), and Castelló and Domenéch (2002) that the relevant 
distribution in explaining the relationship between inequality and growth in many theoretical 
analyses is that of wealth, which is best described by land or human capital, rather than by 
income. In fact, as will be discussed in more detail in Subsection 4.2.2, the argumentation line 
of  the  three  theoretical  approaches  predicting  a  negative  impact  of  inequality  on  growth 
suggests that wealth distribution is more relevant than income distribution for the explanation 
of the underlying transmission channels. As a  consequence, one would expect a negative 
coefficient of inequality by those empirical studies using proxies of wealth inequality, but not 
necessarily by those using income inequality. Moreover, the fact that several studies find a 
negative effect for land/human capital inequality and a positive one for income inequality 
when both are included simultaneously may be an additional reason to suspect that both types 
of distribution affect  growth through different  channels. These and other subjects will be 
discussed in more detail in the next subsection. 
 27 
 
4.2  The empirical literature on the transmission channels 
This  subsection  focuses  on  the  empirical  assessment  of  the  transmission  channels  from 
inequality to growth. In contrast with the reduced-form relationship, the empirical literature 
has not paid due attention to the testing of the transmission channels. On the one hand, the 
number of studies addressing certain channels is clearly scarce, which makes it impossible to 
draw any credible conclusion about their validity; on the other hand, most studies do not test 
the transmission channels in the most appropriate way, as they neglect some aspects that are 
crucial to the production of a reliable analysis of the mechanisms through which inequality 
affects growth. Therefore, after systematizing the main conclusions that can be derived from 
the empirical works presented in Subsection 3.2, we will mention some of the main aspects 
that should be considered by this literature and discuss how important they are for a better 
understanding of the channels underlying the inequality-growth relationship. 
4.2.1  Key  conclusions  about  the  empirical  assessment  of  the  transmission  channels 
from inequality to growth 
Taking into account the information presented in Subsection 3.2, we can identify three main 
conclusions  with  respect  to  the  empirical  literature  on  the  transmission  channels  from 
inequality to growth: 
i)  The empirical evidence does not support the fiscal policy channel; 
ii)  There seems to be some support for the credit market imperfections channel, although 
the results are far from being conclusive; 
iii)  The works on the political instability channel and on the saving channel are very scarce, 
which prevents us from drawing any credible conclusion about their validity. 
The first conclusion is clear from the analysis of the information contained in Table 2. Nearly 
all the studies testing specifically the fiscal policy channel find no evidence for it. Persson and 
Tabellini (1994), Perotti (1996) and Sylwester (2000) find evidence supporting the political 
mechanism but not the economic mechanism. This means that the theoretical prediction that 
inequality leads to an increase in taxation and redistributive expenditure is correct, but the 
prediction that taxation and redistribution are harmful for subsequent growth because of their 
distortionary  effects  is  not.  Besides,  the  fact  that  the  results  on  the  distinct  effects  of 
inequality  on  growth  between  democracies  and  non-democracies  are  far  from  being 28 
 
consensual  may  be  another  indication  that  the  fiscal  policy  mechanism  is  not  relevant  to 
explain these effects.  
Regarding  the  credit  market  imperfections  channel,  there  seems  to  be  some  evidence 
supporting  it.  Perotti  (1996)  and  Deininger  and  Squire  (1998)  find  that  inequality  has  a 
negative influence in human capital investment, while Deininger and Olinto (2000) find that it 
harms primarily investment in physical capital. According to these authors, these results show 
that the credit market imperfections channel is strong. We argue, however, that this association 
is rather abusive, as the negative effect of inequality on investment in  both physical and 
human capital may not be due to the existence of credit market imperfections. Thus, it would 
be more appropriate to test this channel using a variable that measures specifically the degree 
of credit market imperfections and test how this variable is associated with inequality and 
investment in physical and human capital. Perotti (1996) did so by interacting the loan-to-
value ratio for home mortgages and the ratio of domestic credit to GDP with the income 
distribution  variable.  He  obtained  inconclusive  results,  as  these  variables  turned  to  be 
insignificant. However, as Perotti himself states, this is an imperfect way of testing the credit 
market imperfections channel, as the variables he used are a very crude approximation to the 
concept of borrowing constraints. Hence, we can say that there may be some evidence that 
supports this channel, but the results should be interpreted very cautiously. 
As for the saving and the sociopolitical instability channels, the empirical works attempting to 
test their validity are very scarce. Barro (2000) finds that aggregate saving rates do not depend 
on the degree of inequality, and Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Perotti (1996) conclude that 
there is evidence to support the sociopolitical instability channel. However, these works are 
clearly insufficient to draw any reliable conclusion about the way these two channels operate.  
4.2.2  Key aspects to be considered when testing the transmission channels 
In  this  subsection  we  look  at  some  methodological  aspects  that  we  think  are  of  prime 
importance in order to produce an accurate assessment of the validity of each transmission 
channel, but that have been clearly neglected by the existing empirical literature.  
We have already mentioned the inadequate procedure that has been used to test the credit 
market imperfections channel. Most studies have failed to include in the regressions a variable 
measuring  specifically  the  degree  of  credit  market  imperfections  and  thus  to  examine  its 
relationship with inequality and investment. This type of analysis is necessary if we want to 
properly test this mechanism, as it allows examining if the relationship between inequality 29 
 
and investment in physical and human capital found in the existing literature is indeed due to 
the existence of credit market imperfections.  
As for the fiscal policy channel, more attention should be paid to the fiscal variable that is 
used. First, it is very important to choose the appropriate variable, that is, a variable that 
captures accurately the nature of the mechanisms presented by the theoretical models. As 
mentioned in Section 2, the link between income distribution and growth in this approach is 
the pressure for redistribution that arises in highly unequal societies; on the other hand, what 
matters  for  growth  are  the  distortions  caused  by  the  taxation  that  accompanies  the 
redistributive expenditures. Hence, as Perotti (1996) argues, the appropriate fiscal variable 
should be related to either public expenditures that have an explicit redistributive nature (e.g., 
social security and welfare, health and housing, and public expenditure of education) or to 
measures of taxation (such as the average marginal rate, the average tax on labor, and the 
average personal income tax). Second, it is also important to investigate how sensitive the 
results are to the choice of the fiscal policy variable, given the differences in the nature of 
some of the mentioned variables. 
Another aspect that should not be ignored in the estimation of all the transmission channels is 
the  consideration  of  country/region  specificities.  One  of  the  most  important  conclusions 
resulting from the analysis of the empirical works on the reduced-form relationship is that 
these specificities play a crucial role in the inequality-growth relationship. Hence, they should 
be also considered in the empirical studies of the transmission channels. This can be done by 
including regional dummies in cross section regressions, using panel data (which is something 
that has not been explored yet), or testing the channels using small samples composed by 
countries with similar characteristics. 
Another idea of crucial importance is the fact that the transmission channels should be tested 
in a way that is consistent with the assumptions on which the theoretical models are based. In 
particular,  we  call  attention  for  three  features  that  should  be  kept  in  mind:  whether  the 
mechanism  operates  primarily  in  the  short-run  or  in  the  long-run;  whether  the  relevant 
distribution to explain the transmission channel is that of wealth or income; whether pre-tax 
income or post-tax income should be used. The consideration of these aspects is relevant not 
only because it allows testing the transmission channels more accurately but also because it 
may give important insights on some of the questions that were discussed in the analysis of 
the reduced-form relationship estimation. 30 
 
Starting with the short-run vs. long-run issue, the key idea is that the four channels are likely 
to operate in different temporal horizons. According to Knowles (2001), the fiscal policy and 
the  sociopolitical  instability  channels  tend  to  be  more  relevant  in  the  medium/long-term 
because, in the first case, there is a considerable time lag between an increase in inequality, 
mounting pressure for more income distribution, and for redistribution to then take place, and, 
in the second case, it takes some time for inequality to lead to sociopolitical instability. By 
contrast, the saving channel tends to be more relevant in the short/medium-term, as it may not 
take  long  for  inequality  to  affect  incentives  and  savings  behavior.  The  credit  market 
imperfections channel, in turn, is likely to operate in both short and long-terms, since the 
repercussions on growth of poor investment in physical capital are immediate, but those of 
poor  investment  in  human  capital  are  not.  Hence,  when  the  first  two  channels  are  tested 
empirically,  a  significant  time  lag  between  growth  and  the  inequality  variable  should  be 
considered; on the other hand, if the aim is to test the saving channel, the time lag should be 
short. This insight may provide further explanations for some of the results found by the 
empirical  literature  testing  the  reduced-form  relationship.  Since  these  studies  regress  the 
average of annual growth rates for a period of 20-30 years on the initial level of inequality, 
most cross-section studies examine the inequality-growth relationship in the long-run. Panel 
data studies, in turn, have examined this relationship in the short-medium run, as they usually 
assess  the  impact  of  inequality  on  growth  over  5-year  periods.  This  may  pose  another 
explanation  for  the  fact  that  the  panel  data  evidence  on  the  correlation  between  income 
inequality  and  growth  is  so  diverse.  Indeed,  we  have  some  studies  predicting  a  negative 
correlation and others predicting a positive one, and this may be a consequence of the fact that 
these studies test the effect of inequality on growth in the short/medium term, in which two 
channels  –  the  saving  channel  and  the  credit  market  imperfections  channel  –  operate  in 
opposite directions. By contrast, in the cross-section studies there is more evidence for the 
existence of a negative relationship, which may occur because all the three channels that are 
more  relevant  in  the  long-run  –  sociopolitical  instability,  fiscal  policy,  and  credit  market 
imperfections channels – imply a negative impact of inequality on growth.  
The four transmission channels also differ with respect to the relevant type of distribution. 
While  in  the  saving  channel  the  income  distribution  is  the  one  that  matters  (because  the 
saving  rates  are  determined  as  a  fraction  of  income),  in  the  credit  market  imperfections 
channel wealth distribution is more relevant (since wealth is more important than income in 
determining  investment  decisions).  In  the  other  two  channels,  in  turn,  both  types  of 31 
 
distributions are relevant. This is a strong argument to support the results obtained by those 
studies that estimated the reduced-form relationship using wealth/asset distribution. As it was 
emphasized in Subsection 4.1.4, the negative effect of land and human capital inequality on 
growth tends to be stronger than that of income inequality. We advanced with the possible 
explanation that the relevant distribution in explaining the relationship between inequality and 
growth in many theoretical analyses might be that of wealth, which is best described by land 
or  human  capital  inequality,  not  that  of  income.  We  have  just  seen  that  there  are  strong 
reasons to believe that this is the case, as wealth distribution is relevant in the three channels 
predicting a negative effect of inequality on growth, whereas income distribution is relevant 
not only in two of these channels, but also in the saving channel. Thus, the fact that wealth 
and income distributions affect the inequality-growth relationship through different channels 
can explain some of the differences found in the estimates of the coefficient associated with 
inequality when both types of distributions are used.  
Finally, there are also differences among the four channels regarding the type of income that 
should be considered. While the sociopolitical instability, the credit market imperfections, and 
the saving channels refer to income inequality after redistribution has taken place, the fiscal 
policy channel refers to inequality of pre-redistribution income. Hence, if this channel is to be 
tested  empirically,  data  on  gross  income  should  be  used,  whereas  data  on  net  income  or 
expenditure are most appropriate for the first three channels. We can relate this idea with the 
results  of  Knowles’  (2001)  work.  As  mentioned  before,  Knowles  finds  that,  for  those 
countries that use gross income distribution, inequality has an insignificant impact on growth, 
whereas for those countries that use expenditure the impact is significant and negative. In 
Subsection 4.1.4, we argued that this divergence could arise because of either differences in 
the  way  of  measuring  income  distribution  or  issues  related  to  sample  selection.  Now  we 
advance with a third possible explanation. Since the use of expenditure captures primarily the 
fiscal policy channel and the use of gross income captures the other three channels, then one 
would expect to find a negative effect of inequality on growth in the first case and an effect of 
any direction in the second case. Thus, Knowles’ findings may also arise because of differences 
in the relative importance of the transmission channels underlying each of the two estimations.   
 
5.  Conclusion 
The estimation of the effect of inequality on growth is subject to a number of methodological 
issues and difficulties, which in part may be responsible for the apparent lack of consensus 32 
 
about  the  way  inequality  influences  growth.  Although  it  is  not  easy  to  systematize  and 
compare  the  results  of  so  many  studies,  especially  when  a  large  array  of  different 
methodological techniques is employed, some conclusions can be derived.  
First, it is evident from our analysis that country and region specific characteristics play a 
crucial role in the determination of the effect of inequality on growth. This conclusion has two 
important implications. On the one hand, it implies that more emphasis should be put on the 
estimation of the inequality-growth relationship on a national/regional basis.  It is perhaps 
more  appropriate  to  study  how  this  relationship  operates  within  a  country  or  a  group  of 
countries with similar characteristics, rather than trying to establish a universal pattern. Such 
an approach provides a better understanding of the inequality-growth process and may also 
present a possible way of overcoming data constraints and empirical methodological issues. 
On  the  other  hand,  since  it  is  risky  to  make  inferences  on  the  impact  of  inequality  in  a 
particular  country  using  coefficient  estimates  from  a  wide  sample  of  countries,  policy 
recommendations should not be based on these estimates, but on those of country studies. 
Secondly, we also conclude that inequality in wealth distribution, proxied by land or human 
capital distribution, seems to have a stronger negative effect on growth than inequality in 
income distribution. This may occur because the channels through which inequality affects 
growth are not the same in both distributions, regardless of problems related to measurement 
errors and comparability across countries that arise when income is used. In particular, wealth 
distribution is likely to be more relevant in the three channels predicting a negative correlation 
between inequality and growth. Exploring in more depth the channels through which wealth 
and income inequality could differentially affect growth might be an interesting question for 
future research. 
Thirdly, the divergences found in the estimation of the reduced form relationship are more 
pronounced in panel data studies. We suggest that these divergences are due to three reasons: 
i) differences in estimation techniques; ii) country/region specificities, which are captured in 
panel  data;  iii)  the  effect  of  opposing  transmission  mechanisms  in  the  short/medium-run, 
which is the time horizon considered in most panel data studies.  
Finally,  the  empirical  studies  specifically  addressing  the  transmission  channels  from 
inequality to growth have been scarce. Besides, they have neglected some important aspects, 
such as the time horizon, the type of distribution, and the definition of income that should be 
used to test each mechanism. We believe that the consideration of these aspects is crucial to 33 
 
produce an accurate assessment of the empirical validity of each mechanism. Therefore, this 
area of research has a vast potential to be yet explored. 
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